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I. Legitimation and Legitimacy of the SED Rule 
 
The German Democratic Republic (GDR) was created by the Soviet power. Therefore, all 
efforts to gain acceptance of its own people should be considered as actions to compensate for 
its general intrinsic lack of legitimacy as a nation state.1 Moreover, the idea of nationalism in 
East Germany took on a subversive meaning because of the division of Germany. The Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) claimed to represent all Germans, which made the political 
leadership of the “Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands” (SED, “Socialist Unity Party of 
Germany”) seem questionable. The communist Party could only partly rely on national values 
and was forced to establish substitutes. Furthermore, the permanent rivalry between the two 
German states and the fact that communists were a minority within the East German society 
put strong pressure on the SED to legitimize its dictatorship. 
 
1. Normative Justification of the Rule: Communism as the Ultimate Aim 
 
Throughout 1945/46 to 1990, the SED used Marxist-Leninist ideology as the basic 
justification for its claim to power in all stages of its rule. At the core of this oversimplified 
historical materialism lay the belief that the communists not only knew the law of historical 
development but were also able to control social progress. Hence, the constitutionally stated 
leading role of the SED was legitimized by the idea that the party should act as the executor 
of the historical law that would lead towards a classless society. This idea allows the 
designation of the GDR as an ideocracy. 
The SED did not announce the construction of socialism openly until the 2nd Party Conference 
in July 1952. By that time, institutions required for such a massive change in the East German 
society had been ready for implementation for a long time. The following months of 
“accelerated construction of socialism” were characterized by entanglement of normative 
legitimacy and repression. Ideology was used widely to justify expropriations, imprisonments, 
and political sentences. This phase lasted only 11 months. Subsequently, the SED suddenly – 
at Moscow’s command – changed its policy, which was widely perceived as weakness and 
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lead to the uprising in June 1953. After the failed revolt the SED quit the extreme repression 
of “objective enemies” (but administered harsh punishments to the alleged “ringleaders” at 
the same time). Establishing a harmonious communist society remained to be the central aim 
of the SED, which simultaneously served as the legitimization basis of its rule. However, 
slight modifications were made in the following years. 
By the end of the 1950s the SED leadership had started to include technocratic expertise in its 
political decision-making processes. This tendency became the official party line in 1963. 
According to Sigrid Meuschel, technocratic ideology was added to normative legitimization 
as a new strategy. However, the technocratic elements functioned as a “hidden legitimization,” 
because open revisionism was impossible in view of the Iron Curtain. 
Nevertheless, there was an enduring tendency to pursue legitimization via reforms. For 
example, the New Course in 1953, the New Economic Policy in the 1960s, the welfare policy 
in the 1970s or propaganda for “socialism in the colors of the GDR” in the 1980s all targeted 
the legitimacy of the SED rule to unify continuity and change. 
During the reign of Erich Honecker (1971–1989), the utopia of communism was less 
important. Instead, the focus was shifted towards “actually existing socialism”. Legitimacy 
was based on welfare policy rather than on pure ideology but included still elements of 
communist utopia: social justice, homogeneity, and security.2 The social ideal of harmony 
joined with aims such as justice, peace and solidarity.3 
During the Peaceful Revolution of autumn 1989 it became apparent how deeply anchored the 
communist ideals were, even amongst non-communists. Many initiators of the opposition 
movement still adhered to the idea of an improved socialist society as an alternative to 
Western capitalism.4 
In summary, normative legitimization based on utopia (which could be considered a general 
feature of all communist dictatorships) granted East German communists a sense of working 
and fighting for a common good, if not for the highest social ideal. This belief in utopian 
ideals was important insofar as “the commitment of elites to the system”5 had a strong effect 
on the stability of the political regime. However, because true believers constituted a 
minority, the SED had to develop additional legitimization strategies, considering the specific 
historical conditions of the Soviet Occupation zone and the GDR. 
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 2. Multi-Party System 
 
The Soviet occupying power had already approved several political parties within a few 
weeks after the end of World War II. Elections were held in 1946, followed by the formation 
of local parliaments (Landtage) in the re-established German countries that included a 
remarkable number of non-communist politicians. As a result of the merging of the Social 
Democrats and Communists in spring 1946 (a process often termed as “forced unification,” 
although this does not entirely reflect historical facts),6 the SED was faced with two strong 
non-communist parties: the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDPD). In the relatively free elections of October 1946, these two parties were able to 
win the majority of the seats in two of the five state parliaments (Landtag Sachsen-Anhalt and 
Landtag Brandenburg).7 
The successive formation of a communist party dictatorship seemed to begin with a relatively 
democratic phase. However, writers such as Karl Wilhelm Fricke understood this to be 
merely a tactical ploy by the communists to disguise the subtle implementation of a 
dictatorship. Indeed, the SED staffed many key administrative positions and put pressure on 
the non-communist parties, often with the help from the Soviet Military Administration 
(SMAD). Here, the SED could remind the other parties of the principle of consensual 
decision-making put into place by the Soviet occupational power in June 1945 as a 
precondition for the approval of the political parties.8 
This interpretation as a merely deceptive manoeuvre of the communists has remained 
controversial. For example, Wilfried Loth held a more differentiating view by referring to 
sources taken from Stalin’s immediate circle. It is beyond dispute that the party leader Walter 
Ulbricht was intent on appropriating crucial positions in the state administration as quickly as 
possible. Wolfgang Leonhard was right when he described Ulbricht’s intention as, 
“Everything has to appear democratic but we should have everything in our grip.” Stalin 
slowed down the revolutionary zeal of the German communists several times and considered 
at the end of 1948 the political course of the SED becoming a “Volksdemokratie” (“People’s 
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democracy”) to be premature. 9  Therefore, one should acknowledge a certain amount of 
openness and ambiguity in the years 1946 and 1947, even though the chances of an alternative 
development were small. 
A comprehensive and irreversible erosion of democratic structures in the Soviet Occupation 
Zone did not occur until 1948, in the context of the open acknowledgement of the Cold War. 
The erosion can be observed on several occasions. At the state level, two satellite parties were 
founded. The National Democratic Party (NDPD) offered integration to former members of 
the Nazi party and Wehrmacht, whereas the German Peasant’s Party (DBD) attempted to 
bring a socialist ideology to the rural population. At the local level, municipal self-
administration bodies were deprived of their decision-making authority in favor of a central 
administration.10 In the economic sphere, special interest groups like the worker’s councils 
and the chambers of industry and commerce were transformed into aid agencies of SED 
policies.11 
An impressive example of the interplay between mock-democracy and implementation of a 
dictatorship is the People’s Congress movement (Volkskongress-Bewegung). It emerged as a 
form of “all-German pre-parliament” in contrast to the Parlamentarischer Rat (“Parliamentary 
Council”) in the Western Allied occupation zones. However, it developed into a proto-
structure of the People’s Chamber (Volkskammer). The latter was finally constituted in the 
GDR on October 7, 1949. As an institution of acclamation, the almost powerless People’s 
Chamber incarnated the pseudo-parliamentarianism of the GDR.12 
The mock-democracy was established ultimately through the so-called “Volkswahlen” 
(“people’s elections”), which were conducted under massive political pressure in 1950. From 
then on, elections were conducted only for show. 
The GDR’s multi-party system was little more than a relic of the past, particularly since the 
SED explicitly rejected the Western parliamentary model as a covered-up rule of the capital 
and instead adhered to Lenin’s leadership model of “democratic centralism.” An interesting 
question is why the SED maintained a multi-party system. There are several possible answers. 
First, it made clear to the West that the sovereignty of the people constituted the basis for 
legitimate rule, even in the GDR. The SED even idealized the GDR’s political system as “true 
democracy.” Second, regular elections were one of the many rituals of acclamation, alongside 
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with organized mass demonstrations on May 1, meetings of the youth organizations, the 
“Turn- und Sportfest” (“Gymnastics and Sports Festival”), and the SED party conferences. As 
such, they helped to display the alleged unity between party leaders and ordinary people. 
Despite the staged nature of this “democracy,” mass mobilization could, at least partly and 
particularly in younger people, foster belief in legitimacy, or turn mere loyalty into a belief in 
legitimacy. 
Furthermore, the existence of bloc parties performed not only a transmission function to 
communicate the political intent of SED-leaders to parts of the population that could not be 
directly reached otherwise, but also an alibi function, because it enabled non-communists to 
be politically active without being forced to deny their basic convictions.13 
 
3.  Anti-Fascism 
 
In 1945 all political forces in the Soviet Occupation Zone considered anti-fascism to be the 
mandatory basis of rebuilding the German state. As coded by the allies in the “Potsdam 
Agreement,” a war should never again emanate from German soil; this was the official 
political consensus. At the same time, anti-fascism justified the Communist Party’s grasp on 
power both towards the remaining previous elites and towards the present competitors. In this 
way, the communists could refer to their heroic resistance movement against the Nazi regime, 
which totalled a very high number of victims. At the beginning of the 1950s, the SED 
reinforced the exploitation of anti-fascism in domestic and foreign policy and caused a 
fundamental change in the function of anti-fascism. Instead of the previous self-organization 
of the affected parties, the state now appropriated the politics of memory by linking 
humanistic ideals with the dictatorial aim of controlling all activities. Rather than being an 
incorporation of a pluralistic commemorative culture, anti-fascism became the central symbol 
of legitimacy in the GDR.14 
While presenting itself as the “better and uncompromised anti-fascist state,” the GDR also 
offered integration to most East Germans that had not committed crimes but had supported 
National Socialism. The only condition was to support or at least accept the existence of the 
SED regime. Herfried Münkler pointed out that this combination of exculpation and duty of 
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loyalty made many people morally dependent on the socialist state.15 Obviously, this offer 
was accepted widely and had a concurrent “widespread sense of departure.”16 
Externally, anti-fascism served the SED state as a legitimization strategy against the Federal 
Republic, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s. Anti-fascism contained an understandable fear 
of former Nazi elites regaining political influence in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).  
This fear was compounded with the communist definition of fascism, formulated by Georgi 
Dimitroff in 1935. According to this definition, fascism represented an “open terrorist 
dictatorship of the most reactionary, chauvinistic, and imperialist elements of finance 
capital.”17 In the context of the communist ideology, the successive abolishment of private 
ownership as the means of production in the Soviet Occupation Zone/GDR also eliminated 
the economic roots of fascism. Therefore, anti-fascism and communism appeared to be 
identical in essence. 
Domestically, denouncing critics and opponents of the communist dictatorship as fascists 
provided the SED with a means of rule and repression.18 For example, it was used after the 
uprising on June 17, 1953, which was defamed as an “attempted fascist coup.” In 1961 the 
Berlin Wall was officially referred to as the “Anti-Fascist Barricade” (“antifaschistischer 
Schutzwall”) and its function was rhetorically perverted. 
Nevertheless, it is inadequate to reduce the function of anti-fascism in the GDR to sheer 
exploitation designed to justify the SED dictatorship. There was a temporary but strong 
connection between anti-fascism and the national cultural ideals of civic humanism.19 The 
ability of anti-fascism to create an East German socialist identity derived mainly from two 
issues. First, the SED tried to embed anti-fascism in a long historical process and to establish 
a historical line of revolutionary ancestors that began with the peasant wars of the 16th century 
and continued with the failed revolutions in 1848 and 1918 to the present day. Second, anti-
fascism was associated with a conservative aesthetic judgment: Weimar Classicism and 
Socialistic Realism instead of Decadence and Formalism, particularly in the 1950s.20 This 
reference to the “good” and “healthy” national tradition enabled anti-fascism to become the 
“primary, identity-creating foundation myth”21 of the GDR that tied a great many of the 
intelligentsia and artists to the SED. Their literature and films were also disseminated widely 
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in the Federal Republic where issues such as Nazi-backgrounds or crimes were broached 
rarely but instead collectively concealed in the Adenauer era. 
For quite a long period of time participation in the resistance movement against National 
Socialism provided leading functionaries of SED, not least Erich Honecker, with certain 
esteem and legitimacy.22 The same applied to the dissident Robert Havemann: the SED did 
not dare imprison the former member of the anti-fascist resistance; they instead imposed 
house arrest in 1976. 
Until the end of the GDR, anti-fascism had the potential to inspire loyalty towards the state, 
even though the “cohesiveness of the propagandized anti-fascist values” 23  diminished 
remarkably in the 1980s. 
 
4.  “Unity of Economic and Welfare Policy”: Performance Legitimacy 
 
The move towards an expansion of welfare policy introduced under Erich Honecker at the 8th 
Party Conference of the SED in 1971 could be conceived as a transition from normative to 
functional legitimacy.24 During the administration of Honecker (1971–1989), the dictatorial 
welfare state was characterized as much by numerous socio-political measures as by the 
feverish attempt to gain legitimacy via economic success. For instance, daily news footage on 
the television depicted industrious workers and peasants in factories and in the fields, working 
hard to fulfil the plans and preserve the myth that the GDR was one of the ten leading 
industrial nations in the world. 
Other examples of attempts by the SED to justify their dictatorship by performance were 
projects aimed at enhancing prestige. Most notable example of such a project was the 
promotion of sports with a special focus on the maximum yield of gold medals. One should 
by no means deny the widespread enthusiasm for successful athletes, but it would be 
misleading to interpret this entirely as support for the socialist state.25 The GDR also managed 
to send the first German into outer space (Sigmund Jähn) and the SED conducted a long-
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lasting propaganda campaign regarding the production of a megabyte chip (side-stepping the 
fact that the GDR was not at the forefront of micro-electronic technology). 
One of the key slogans of the SED was the “Unity of Economic and Welfare Policy,” which 
was defined as the increasing satisfaction of the needs of the populace on the basis of 
improved economic performance. In political practice the relation was inverted: the SED 
granted unconditional, far-reaching social benefits hoping that this would stimulate 
motivation; a calculation that turned out to be false. 26  Admittedly, the welfare expenses 
(compared with those for defence, the police and the secret service) were not excessively 
high, but due to an increasing habituation the “social achievements” were only partly able to 
increase the acceptance of the regime.27 
Nevertheless, the party was able to sustain legitimacy in the GDR for much longer than the 
communists in Hungary or Poland, in particular by guaranteeing stability and social security. 
This was possible despite, or maybe because of the fact that the SED leadership favored 
political aims over economic considerations. 28  This even proved the case during the 
temporary supply crises in the GDR. Disgruntled workers demanded that the SED fulfil their 
welfare promises without calling into question the general rule of the party. Such critiques 
made in petitions could be interpreted as affirmations of a tacit social contract.29 The contract 
is often described as an exchange of political loyalty and everyday co-operation for social 
security and welfare.30 
However, by the second half of the 1970s, when it became clear that the SED was unable to 
increase living standards as promised, the “Janus-faced character”31 of the social-political 
strategy of stabilization became apparent. For a long time, since the abatement of the 
upheaval of June 17, 1953 and the subsequent compromise with workers, the SED was very 
aware that every attempt to enforce a higher output of production by political means would 
endanger its legitimacy, but the relaxation of this rule had the same effect by diminishing 
economic performance.32  
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Discontent increased and tens of thousands applied for an exit permit. During interrogation 
nearly half of the emigrants named material dissatisfaction as one of the main reasons for 
emigrating.33 As the rapid demise of the GDR in 1990 demonstrated, its social achievements 
proved too weak to support the legitimacy of the rule34 after the most important mechanism of 
repression, the Wall, came down. 
 
5.  Further Strategies to Claim Legitimacy 
 
In order to establish a socialist nation, the SED extended the range of the GDR’s national 
heritage remarkably. The 1980s witnessed a revival of Prussian traditions, the reissuing of 
Karl May’s Wild West novels, the publication of Sigmund Freud’s works on psychoanalysis 
and, most notably, the state-organized celebration of Martin Luther King’s anniversary in 
1983, which coincided with more cooperative state-church relations. 
Furthermore, in the Honecker era “the domestic and international aspects of legitimacy were 
closely interlinked.”35  The SED could hope that growing international recognition would 
improve their acceptance at home. By presenting different kinds of aid to the Third World as 
more or less altruistic, the internationalist solidarity of East Germany was expected to 
promote the image of a better German state. How successful was this strategy? The GDR 
claimed moral legitimacy partly due to solidarity with Nicaragua, Angola, and Mozambique. 
Probably the biggest achievement of the SED was granting political asylum to several 
thousand emigrants from Chile, whose lives were endangered during the dictatorship of 
General Pinochet. 
The GDR presented itself as a peace-loving state on the international scene, particularly in the 
1980s, and also conducted cultural campaigns such as a yearly music festival “Rock for 
Peace” (“Rock für den Frieden”) at home. The one-sided demands for disarmament in the 
West made those efforts not entirely convincing. Finally, in the last two years of its existence 
the GDR created elements of a constitutional state, which for the first time permitted juridical 
action against government decisions. An appellate court was established at the Supreme Court 
and a law enabled administrative judicature, but it did not come into force until summer 1989. 
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That trend could be understood as a late attempt of legitimization towards Western 
democracy. However, the attempts remained half-hearted, and the judicature continued to be 
“subordinate to the policy of the party.”36 
 
II. Repression 
 
1. Measures of Repression of Soviet Occupational Power and the SED 
 
After the end of Second World War it was the Soviet occupational power that exerted 
political arbitrariness and terror, whereby the justifiable penalization of war criminals and the 
use of repression to secure political rule interfered with each other. Certain instruments of 
repression that the allied forces devised jointly, such as the internment camps or special laws, 
were overexpanded or even abused in the Soviet Occupied Zone. 
The only purpose of detention in special camps was to ensure the isolation of potential 
enemies as a political preventative strategy. The high death rate—almost a third of the nearly 
150,000 German inmates in the Soviet special camps did not survive detention—was mainly 
the result of poor food supply, cold, and diseases. It is not possible to detect any deliberate 
intention on the part of the Soviets to kill camp inmates.37 
After several mass releases the detention system came to an end with the Waldheim trials in 
1950. During accelerated proceedings courts of the newly founded GDR condemned the last 
of approximately 3,400 camp inmates. By processing the Waldheim trials as fast as possible 
and adopting the preliminary work of the Soviet intelligence in a schematic way, the judiciary 
of the GDR passed its first big practical test in the face of the occupational power, which 
continued its own military tribunals against the Germans in the GDR until 1955. 
The Soviet Military Tribunals (SMT) provided the occupational power with a second 
important means of repression. As a rule, the occupational power used a two-pronged 
approach: former Nazi functionaries were detained in special camps, 38 whereas civilians who 
committed offences in the present were prosecuted by the Tribunals.39 Between 1945 and 
1955, the SMT convicted ~35,000 German civilians. The very fact that 72 percent of the 
sentences were passed for “counter-revolutionary crimes” such as espionage, sabotage, or 
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membership in an underground organisation, indicates that these trials could be considered as 
“judicial terror” 41 to secure power. Even offences such as possession of firearms, theft, or 
illegal trespassing of the demarcation line were treated as “counter-revolutionary” intentions 
by the occupying forces; as a result, barely any non-political offences remained. The penalties 
imposed—often 10 or 25 years detainment but also nearly 2,000 death sentences—resulted 
from the careless application of Soviet norms to the everyday life of occupied Germany. This 
highlights the inexorability of the persecution.42 At the same time, recent research suggests 
that the SMT did not act as a means of implementing the dictatorship until 1948, when the 
number of sentences increased and the penalties became harsher.43 
Right from the beginning German auxiliary policemen supported the Soviet persecution 
institutions. When the GDR was founded, a formal division of tasks was scheduled.44 In the 
first half of the 1950s it was the occupational forces that exerted the most extreme kinds. The 
number of death sentences between 1950 and 1955 serves as an obvious example. While 
German courts imposed death sentences on 160 individuals,  ~100 of which were executed, 
the SMT sentenced ~1,150 Germans to death according to clemency appeals during that 
time.45 
 
2. Repression in the GDR’s Consolidation Phase (until 1962) 
 
With the announcement of the accelerated implementation of the foundations of socialism at 
the 2nd Party Conference in July 1952, the SED unleashed a period of extreme repression that 
lasted for nearly a year. On the one hand, oppressive tactics were used against “objective 
enemies.” In several regions of the GDR, militant actions of expropriation were carried out 
against the middle classes, and there were incipient stages of forced collectivisation. At the 
demarcation line, the green border between East and West Germany, a forced displacement 
campaign against allegedly dubious inhabitants was inflicted. In the course of an open 
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confrontation with the evangelical church, several dissident clergymen were arrested and the 
Christian youth (“Junge Gemeinde”) was criminalized. 
On the other hand, tightened repression was directed towards the “ordinary people.” In 
particular, the SED intended to force a socialist owner consciousness on workers, with harsh 
penalties for minor offences (“Law for Protection of People’s Property”).46 
Immediately after the SED (under pressure from Moscow) had withdrawn the decisions made 
at the 2nd Party Conference, the June uprising broke out. Only the intervention of the Red 
Army could rescue the East German state on June 17, 1953 (while Western powers remained 
passive that day). The counter-insurgency of the uprising again showcased the limited 
sovereignty of the GDR. 
Subsequently, the SED politics regarding punishment were contradictory. On the one hand, 
the party implemented the decrees of the “New Course” announced in the days before the 
uprising. As a result, thousands of sentences were revised and ~24,000 prisoners were 
released early. On the other hand, 1,240 participants of strikes and demonstrations were 
convicted. Only 16 percent of the persons arrested in connection with the upheaval were 
sentenced,47 and ~42 percent of these got off with a light sentence of one year or less. Only a 
few leaders of the protest (named as ringleaders) received severe punishment. Werkentin 
assessed the intensity of repression compared with the manner of sentencing in previous 
political trials as “unusually restrained.”48 
At the same time, the SED reacted to the upheaval by pushing ahead the establishment of so-
called “Betriebskampfgruppen” (civil guards in factories), which were supposed to act as 
paramilitary forward posts in the industrial enterprises. Therefore, in addition to the harsh 
punishment of individuals, the SED also developed new repression structures. 
When speaking about terror during the Stalinist period of the GDR, several hundreds of 
abductions of persons from West-Berlin to the East must be mentioned. In most cases 
criminals paid by the Stasi (“Ministerium für Staatssicherheit”) committed these offences. 
Some of the victims of abductions were employees and collaborators of the opposing secret 
services, as well as dissidents and traitors within their own ranks.49 
Another feature of repression in the early years of the GDR was harsh penalties for economic 
crimes (“Wirtschaftsverbrechen”). In the middle of the 1950s the number of prisoners 
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sentenced because of economic crimes remained consistently above 5,000. Werkentin 
believes that a remarkable number of these could be categorized as political prisoners.50 
A decisive break in the practice of juridical persecution took place around 1956/57. The 
changes began in March 1956 at the 3rd Party Conference. The SED leadership bashfully 
initiated a process of de-Stalinisation, which proved to be fairly sustainable. Until that time, 
the SED had considered all crimes directed against the socialist order in principle to be an 
expression of a hostile attitude or inspired by the class enemy. From 1957 on, a new 
supplementary law (“Strafrechtsergänzungsgesetz”) distinguished political offenders  
(“Staatsverbrecher”) from other criminals.51 
Nevertheless, another phase of more rigorous repression occurred in 1960 when the SED 
forced all peasants to join the collective farms. That ideologically motivated action took place 
within weeks, often creating a climate of psychological terror, and was one important cause of 
the increasing number of refugees that year. 
The building of the Berlin Wall, which encompassed the definitive closure of the German-
German border in Berlin and the subsequent establishment of a deadly border system, has to 
be regarded as the most severe aspect of repression in the history of the GDR. According to 
Hope M. Harrison, Soviet Leaders gave their permission to build the Wall after Ulbricht’s 
pleading. That fact underlines the vital interest of the SED leadership in establishing the 
wall.52 It was not so much the number of fatalities—136 people died at the Berlin Wall53—but 
rather the permanent existence of the wall as an unavoidable condition and absolute boundary 
that shaped life in the GDR. 
In autumn 1961, backed by the reality of the wall, the Politburo encouraged party comrades in 
the state institutions and party-dependent mass organizations to carry out “openly terrorist 
practices”54 against unmanageable young people, former illegal border crossers, and real and 
imagined passive resisters. Offences such as verbally attacking the regime, attempted escape 
from the Republic, or receiving Western radio and TV programmes, were dealt with harshly. 
As Falco Werkentin stated in a sarcastic comment, two new instruments for the socialist 
administration of justice were brought into play during this short period of conflict: the 
primitive laws of the jungle and labour camps following the example set by the Soviets. 
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Furthermore, after the definitive closure of the border a second campaign of forced 
resettlement took place in the border area. During the so-called “Aktion Festigung” more than 
3,000 inhabitants of border districts had to leave their homes within 48 hours.55 This phase of 
more severe repression in the GDR came to an end in spring 1962. 
 
3. Changes in the Functioning of the Repression 
 
While repression in the first years of the Soviet occupation and in the early GDR functioned 
as a means of establishing the rule, from 1963 on it rather marked the boundaries of everyday 
life. As Ernst Richert specified in 1963, terror was included in the toolset of the GDR only as 
“ultima ratio”: “The scale of functions ranges from supervision in the public interest, 
‘instructions,’ ‘tireless persuasion work’ of the authorities, and more or less pedantic ‘control 
over the executions’ to creation of an atmosphere of ‘vigilance‘ and the potential 
omnipresence of the state power through spot checks and warnings, up to direct pressure and 
brutal violence.”56  Seemingly, the SED leaders realized that they could reach their goals only 
with, and not against, the masses. Therefore, the party directed state institutions mainly 
towards achieving “approval, co-operation, order, voluntary subjugation.”57 
After the SED had officially announced the moderation of repressive violence in favor of 
reinforced educative measures in 1960, the declared support for terroristic functions of the 
GDR justice system—the open profession as well as justification of legal terror—finally 
ended in 1963.58  
Henceforth, the rendition of the GDR’s justice was characterized by a high portion of 
penalties without imprisonment; the quota reached 60-70 percent. According to Johannes 
Raschka, “it was mainly about educating the offenders of less serious crimes, especially in the 
workplace, and not about punishing for the offence.” 59 
Around the same time that the criminal justice system was liberalized and economic reforms 
were initiated in the GDR (1963), numerous artists could also act more freely, albeit 
temporarily. The 11th Plenum of the SED’s Central Committee, a conference that went down 
in history as the so-called “Clear Cutting Plenum” (“Kahlschlagplenum”), put a sudden end to 
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the liberal phase of cultural politics by imposing a range of bans at the end of 1965. 
Nevertheless, the SED was unable to win the defensive battle against Western cultural 
influences, particularly regarding the youth. In contrast to the harsh rejection of Rock ‘n’ Roll 
and Beat in the 1950s and 1960s, rock music became part of the socialist culture in the 1970s. 
Concurrently, the use of political repression gradually shifted from the judiciary to the Stasi, 
which now acted as the investigation authority for all political proceedings. A total of 23,517 
investigation proceedings took place during the 1960s, reflecting the fact that the secret police 
was not only responsible for state security in the narrower sense, but also for any instance 
“that affected the core stability of the GDR in any way,”60 including felony cases. As a result, 
the number of investigational proceedings of the Staatssicherheit was remarkably higher than 
in the 1970s. 
 
4. Transition of Repression in the 1970s 
 
Shortly after Erich Honecker had assumed power the prisons became full. This was less due 
to political repression than due to the stringent persecution of certain forms of “asocial” 
behaviour. Generally, the judicature tended to be milder in the Honecker era than in the 
previous decades. However, a nuanced picture should be drawn because the alleviation of 
repression was not a continuous process. Initially, the change in leadership from Ulbricht to 
Honecker made the artists in particular sit up and take notice. The new leader pledged that 
there would be no taboo issues in the future as long as the artists operated from a socialist 
standpoint and in subsequent years several writers including Ulrich Plenzdorf and Volker 
Braun took Honecker at his word. 
The liberal period lasted five years and came to an abrupt end when the dissident singer and 
songwriter Wolf Biermann was denaturalized in 1976. After this the SED showcased its range 
of repressive practices against dissidents, including the severe eight-year sentence against 
Rudolf Bahro (who was released in the FRG after one year), the house arrest imposed on 
Robert Havemann, and the forced exit of Rainer Kunze. However, the SED generally backed 
away from extreme measures against prominent critics in their own ranks due to concerns 
about the damage to the GDR’s international reputation. This did not apply to people 
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protesting against the expatriation of Wolf Biermann locally; here, the criminal law was 
enforced mercilessly.61 
Since the mid-1970s a new group of potential offenders became the focus of attention for the 
SED state: applicants for permanent emigration. To persecute their “offence”—the claim of 
the right to leave the country—several articles of penal law were reformulated. Between 1977 
and 1988, ~20,000 investigative proceedings took place against applicants for permanent 
emigration. The implementation of the extended criminal law was believed to discourage 
applicants, but many of them risked possible imprisonment because they were waiting for a 
subsequent paid release by the government of the FRG. 
Owing to the politics of detente and the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE), the GDR improved the conditions in prisons to meet the 
international standards. In 1977, the disciplinary punishments of “severe execution” and 
“strict arrest” were abolished, and the lawfulness of “measures of direct duress” was 
restricted.62 Together with the payments by the FRG for the release of political prisoners—
practice that began in the 1960s—these reforms further improved the situation for victims of 
the SED’s justice. The number of political prisoners decreasing since the mid-1960s reached a 
relatively constant level by the 1970s, and did not decline any further.63  
A move towards a more lenient political justice occurred around 1981/82, which coincided 
with the detoriated economic relations of the GDR and the USSR.64 After the Soviet Union 
had reduced its oil delivery to the GDR, the SED strengthened economic relations with the 
FRG. At the same time, the SED voluntarily reduced the “enthusiasm of persecution.”65 
However, repression did not recede altogether in the 1980s. One characteristic of the 
Honecker period was the shift by the Stasi from “mainly repressive to preventive measures,”66 
which had already begun in the 1970s. The methods of surveillance were applied on a greater 
scale. Combatting of dissidents by creating mistrust (disruption, or “Zersetzung”) became 
increasingly important. The changed strategy required more staff. This is one of the reasons 
why the number of official members of the Stasi increased from 45,000 to 91,000 between 
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1971 and 1989,67 not to mention the even higher number of collaborators. In addition, state 
power more often imposed sanctions outside the criminal law. After revision in 1984, the 
“Verordnung zur Bekämpfung von Ordnungswidrigkeiten” (Regulatory Offences Act) 
enabled actions against the public collection of signatures.68 
The re-directing of the Stasi towards undisclosed forms of repression took place against a 
backdrop of a penal scenario of intimidation. Thus, it was precisely the interaction between 
the ministry of state security and the criminal justice system that “constituted the specific 
character of state persecution under late socialism.”69 
Research regarding repression in the GDR has focused mainly on the Stasi and political 
justice. While these issues are without doubt of great importance, other aspects should not be 
ignored, such as the existence of a grey area of state coercion, in which legal measures and 
political repression merged seamlessly. Some examples of such grey area coercion are the 
compulsory hospitalization of individuals that displayed behavioral problems shortly before 
major state or party ceremonies,70 forced adoptions of children, or the application of the 
asociality-paragraph on recalcitrant youth. 
What should also be considered is the almost unavoidable social disciplining that began in 
kindergarten, continued in youth organisations and during compulsory military service, and 
found its expression in ubiquitous acclamation rituals and the allocation (or denial) of 
privileges. The same applies to the hierarchic quasi-military structure of almost all institutions 
in the GDR that facilitated repression in various fields of everyday life. Bearing in mind 
unofficial forms of repression such as censorship of the arts, obstruction of career prospects, 
or travel bans, a broader view of repression should also consider its latent potential that 
affected wide sections of the population and “gave apparently harmless measures such as a 
traffic check or face-to-face criticism sessions with a superior their true intimidating 
effects.”71 
 
III. Co-optation 
 
Whereas state repression is well researched, co-optation—the involvement of persons who 
were politically indifferent or remained outside the centre of power in decision-making 
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bodies—has not played such a prominent role in the analysis of the political system of the 
Soviet Occupation Zone/GDR. This is not necessarily a research gap, since co-optation 
remained a marginal practice throughout the existence of the GDR and occurred only in a 
strictly controlled manner. In theory, the co-optation of persons previously distant from 
political authority could have the effect of transferring new ideas to the centre of power. This 
possibility is expressed in Peter Ludz’s term “consultative authoritarianism.”72 If innovative 
ideas were introduced, the integration of a “counter-elite” could result in revolutions from 
above. However, the recruitment of officials in the GDR was, above all, determined by the 
state’s intentions. The new staff, however distant from power or politically indifferent, 
underwent a process of integration and increasing involvement in the state apparatus.73 
This is underlined by Heike Solga’s interview-based study, which investigated the usual entry 
into the “socialist service classes” of the GDR. Party loyalty was a crucial factor in the Soviet 
Occupation Zone and during the first years of the GDR that facilitated massive social 
climbing of sons of underprivileged strata of the society. This also occurred during the next 
phase of building and consolidation until the end of the 1970s, when public displays of loyalty 
to the system (expressed as party membership or the performance of a political function) were 
more important than social background.74 The new socialist elite established in the course of 
this recruitment process was characterised by “homogeneity, consistent behavior and 
conformity to the system.”75 Furthermore, in the 1980s junior staff increasingly came only 
from the service classes. Hence, heterogeneity or even changes were rather unlikely to 
materialize. 
In summary, co-optation, understood as the involvement of persons who were distant from 
power or politically indifferent in decision-making bodies, was a rather negligible factor in 
the GDR history. However, this general assessment has to be specified, particularly regarding 
the first years when the communist functionaries operated from a precarious minority 
position. 
 
1. Co-optation of Bourgeois Professionals and Politicians in the Post-war Era  
 
                                                 
72 Peter Christian Ludz, Parteielite im Wandel, Köln 1970, p. 324. 
73 My concerns about the limited usefulness of the category of co-optation regarding the GDR also apply to an 
extended concept of co-optation. Assuming that the contribution of wide sections of the population could be 
achieved by state allocations, “mass co-optation” is eventually only a synonym for conformity. 
74 Cf. Heike Solga, Klassenlagen und soziale Ungleichheit in der DDR. In: APuZ, B 46/96, p. 25. Therefore, 
working class sons could access privileged positions despite a lower standard of education, and sons of self-
employed parents had good chances of success, when they demonstrated loyalty to the party. 
75 Großbölting, SED-Diktatur und Gesellschaft, p. 430. 
After the social breakdowns at the end of the war people with a middle-class or social-
democratic background gained considerable influence in politics and in the administration of 
the Soviet Occupation Zone. In particular, from 1946 to 1948 bourgeois professionals could 
participate in political life to a substantial degree and were able to apply their expertise 
acquired during the Weimar Republic, above all in the context of municipal self-
administration.76 Moreover, there were the first signs of the restoration of state of law.77 The 
co-operation of communist and non-communist political figures was based upon an “anti-
fascist-democratic consensus.” 
However, the co-optation of the non-communist middle class turned out to be a phase-out 
model. When bourgeois politicians refused to bow to the policy of the SED they were 
expelled from their positions and imprisoned for political reasons; several of them paid for 
their courageous resistance with their lives. Waves of arrests and show trials demonstrated the 
futility of protest and forced many members of the non-communist parties to flee to West 
Germany.  
At the same time, the non-communist parties suffered from a massive loss of members; for 
example, the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) forfeited half of its membership between 
1950 and 1956. 78  After unsuccessful resistance and mass withdrawals, the CDU and the 
LDPD (“Liberal-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands”) became, together with the DBD 
(“Demokratische Bauernpartei Deutschlands”) and the NDPD (“National-Demokratische 
Partei Deutschlands”), the so-called fipple flutes in the unitary concert of the “National 
Front.” Its fixed proportions ensured that the SED always held the majority. Admittedly, some 
functionaries of the bloc parties occupied high posts in the government, mostly in deputy 
positions but also as ministers. The practical effects of that kind of co-optation were minor. 
Nominally non-communists, these co-opted functionaries contributed to the functioning of the 
dictatorship via the overt recognition of the leading role of the SED and far-reaching backing 
of all decisions. Even tendencies of “gradual depoliticization and the subcutaneous denial at 
the base”79 of the CDU and the LDPD did not find expression in any modification of the 
SED’s policies. 
As early as the end of the 1940s, the former social democrats began to lose more and more 
influence within the SED. The principle of equality regarding personnel in leading positions, 
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which was introduced after the merger of the KPD and the SPD, was no longer enforced.80 In 
contrast, several waves of political purging took place from 1948 onwards during the course 
of the conversion of the SED into a Leninist party (seizing on the idea of being the avant-
garde of the working class). 
The political incapacitation of the non-communist parties and the concurrent disempowerment 
of former social democrats coincided with the demise of what was left of private 
entrepreneurship in the GDR. Large estate and firms had been quickly expropriated and 
socialized, but smaller private companies existed in part for quite a long time. The SED 
postponed the comprehensive conversion of small firms until the final socialization campaign 
in 1972. Meanwhile, the official rhetoric of an alliance between the SED and small businesses 
“always remained propaganda and was counteracted by the exercising of economic policy in 
practical terms.”81 
In the 1950s there was still limited co-optation of the non-communist educated classes. 
Bourgeois academics were indispensable for organization of research and teaching at 
universities. Accordingly, the technocratic intelligentsia occupied key positions in industrial 
plants. In some chemical enterprises bourgeois managers possessed even greater power than 
the party functionaries at the plant.82  
Another specific case of co-optation was the involvement of former military personnel of the 
Wehrmacht in the establishment of the “National People’s Army” (“Nationale Volksarmee,” 
NVA) in 1956. Not only were numerous lower ranks recruited, but officers and even generals 
also played a crucial part. This was done for pragmatic reasons, and the SED deployed former 
Wehrmacht commanders as experts (“Nur-Fachleute”). The Stasi classified them as posing a 
“security risk.” By 1957, the SED dismissed the majority of the former Wehrmacht officers 
from service in response to the uprising in Hungary.83 
In the Soviet Occupation Zone and during the first decade of the GDR, there was a partial co-
optation of bourgeois experts that occasionally had a remarkable influence. However, the 
early co-optation was a stopgap and phase-out-model. During the 1950s a process of 
“Entbürgerlichung” (dismantling of the bourgeois class) took place in the GDR. It affected the 
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educated middle-class, amongst others, and led to the result that “the updating and passing on 
of constitutive cultural knowledge was strictly bound to the private sphere.”84 
It is debatable whether these examples showcase the “continued existence of educated 
middle-class niches in the society of the GDR, which was defined as socialistic,”85 or whether 
their activities were integrated into the SED state to a higher degree (“dialektisch 
aufgehoben”). For example, the church-based Thomas school and Thomaner choir in Leipzig 
were considered to be “model representatives” of the East German state. 
However, the co-optation of non-communists in effectively leading positions of the SED state 
did not take place. Even revisionist proponents from within the ranks could not influence 
party policy. In this regard, the 1950s were a “wasted chance” in the GDR.86 Neither in the 
wake of the uprising of 1953, nor after the 20th Party Conference of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union in 1956 could reformist politicians gain acceptance in the inner circles of the 
SED. 
 
2. Changing of the Party Elite? 
 
By the end of the 1960s a transformation of the SED’s exercise of power took place. 
According to Peter Christian Ludz, the “representatives of the strategic cliques” were 
confronted with a new generation of “institutionalized counter-elite, party experts, and 
revisionist ideologists” who launched structural changes.87 Ludz referred to the economic 
reforms over the course of the “New Economic System” (NES). Enacted at the 6th party 
conference at the beginning of 1963, the NES aimed for the programmatic involvement of 
experts in policy making. Most of the exponents of the so-called “counter-elite” were also 
party functionaries. Nevertheless, they mainly advocated a technocratic and rational way 
forward and by doing this they at least partially questioned the previous utopian legitimacy of 
the party rule. Ludz pointed out to the following changes: shift in the leading principles from 
political to socio-political and economic principles, partial decentralization, and a tendency 
towards professionalization. 
In addition, the reforms were accompanied by far-reaching changes in the organizational 
structure of the party. For example, “the leading party bodies were opened up at various levels 
to unelected party members and even to members of other parties or no party at all”, at least 
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in the beginning.88 Accordingly, implementation of the reinforced co-optation coincided with 
the definitive end of declared justice terror against enemies of the state.89  
However, the economic reforms were experiments limited both in range and time. The 
economic leadership principles were revised in 1968. 90  In addition, despite the partial 
liberalization the Politburo determined the “fundamental tasks and the essential proportions of 
distribution,” 91  even in the reform era of the 1960s. With the exception of Erich Apel, 
chairman of the State Planning Commission,92 no technocratic experts were co-opted into the 
inner circle of the SED at any time. The “counter-elite” was a temporary phenomenon at the 
most; in the 1970s most of the NES proponents implemented Honecker’s policies. A study of 
the department heads in the SED Central Committee clearly supports this impression. The 
departments of the Central Committee made decisions that the Politburo approved 
subsequently. During the reforms the heads of departments played a key role in implementing 
the NES. When Honecker came to power, a “political disempowerment of the institutionalised 
counter-elite” occurred and the experts withdrew to their area of competence, which was 
virtually “a self-dissolution of this part of the elite as a politically relevant faction.”93 
 
3. Was Co-optation a Last Missed Opportunity for the SED in Autumn 1989? 
 
The basic idea of the appeal “Aufbruch 89 – Neues Forum” drafted on September 10, 1989 
could be seen as an invitation for co-optation. The aim of the New Forum was to create “a 
political platform for the entire GDR.” The authors of the appeal, GDR civil rights activists, 
were convinced that, “This will allow people from all professions, parties and groups to take 
part in the discussion and resolution of crucial social problems in this country.”94 The SED 
categorically refused and responded with arrests and intimidation. After the breakthrough of 
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the Peaceful Revolution on October 9, 1989 in Leipzig, Erich Honecker was forced to resign. 
However, the SED continued to show an unwillingness to co-operate with anyone from 
outside the inner circle. Not even the supposed reformer Hans Modrow, the SED functionary 
from Dresden, was given a chance. Instead, Honecker’s “crown prince” Egon Krenz assumed 
all three functions of his political mentor. By doing so he clearly demonstrated that the 
“Wende” he declared would not affect the leading role of the SED. 
Co-optation was introduced in some places at the local level only in the last days before the 
Wall came down. The round tables that were established in the last months of 1989 could also 
be considered as attempts of co-optation. However, these were transitory institutions. The 
Modrow government approved the round tables in January 1990, but this was far too late. By 
the end of that month, politicians of the opposition became ministers without portfolio, which 
was a rather ineffective effort to increase the standing of Modrow’s government at that late 
stage. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
In 1945, German communism had a difficult start for several reasons. Communists were 
already marginalized in the Weimar Republic and they held a low social status. They were 
able to win respect mainly from the military triumphs of the Soviet Union. At the same time, 
this implied an alienation from their compatriots because communists were perceived as the 
“little brothers” of Moscow. The strategies used by the SED to gain legitimacy aimed at 
establishing dictatorship and integrating non-communists. These strategies were based on 
mechanisms such as discharging guilty conscience of former National Socialists on condition 
of their commitment to the anti-fascist GDR, creating a national identity, permitting political 
activity of non-communists in bloc parties, and satisfying the consumer needs of the 
populace. 
At the same time, the strategies of legitimization were part of the asymmetric entangled 
history of both German states. All measures such as anti-fascism, pseudo-pluralism, economic 
reforms, welfare policy, and the beginnings of administrative jurisdiction were also targeted 
to the Federal Republic. This underscores the pressure to justify its actions that the SED faced 
permanently. 
The terms legitimacy, repression, and co-optation describe the actions of the ruling party. 
Therefore, this article has focused on the intentions of the SED. This approach could be 
considered appropriate because of the obvious fact that the party strived to permeate all 
aspects of society.95 However, to what extent did the SED realize their aspirations? 
It is extraordinarily difficult to assess the extent of recognition that the SED could actually 
gain. To categorize the inhabitants of the GDR as either supporting or resisting the regime 
means to oversimplify the situation, to ignore the fact that individuals behave differently in 
different contexts and to overlook the superposition of consent and dissent in certain cases.96 
Nevertheless, a long-term study in West Germany applied a complex research design to 
provide a useful estimate of how effective of the SED’s legitimization strategies were. During 
the 1970s, ~25 percent of the populace endorsed the political system, and another 25 percent 
rejected the SED rule. Nearly half of the GDR populace were categorized as compliant or 
indifferent in this study. In the 1980s, the percentage of supporters dropped to 20 percent, and 
the number of opponents was proportionally higher (ca. 30 percent).97 The study suggests that 
the percentage of committed supporters of GDR socialism never exceeded 30 percent, not 
even in the so-called “golden” 1970s. 
The communist utopia generated belief in legitimacy solely among a minority. In addition, the 
SED could partially justify its rule by defining the GDR as an anti-fascist state, particularly in 
the Ulbricht era. The provisional beginnings of a parliamentary democracy were gradually 
hollowed out, resulting in a multi-party-system that attempted to disguise the dictatorial rule 
of the SED inner circle. In the Honecker era the SED gained legitimacy particularly by 
providing the population with social security and welfare. Even though welfare spending 
undermined the long-term economy, the GDR remained stable for much longer than the other 
socialist states. However, the existence of the East German state was based on repression at 
all times, including enforced immobilization after the construction of the Wall in 1961. 
Another specific and at the same time tragic feature of repression in the GDR was that the 
SED first created a range of offences that were punished subsequently. Private entrepreneurs 
were stigmatised as “objective enemies”, freedom of expression was abolished, and even the 
desire to leave the country was criminalized. 
Over the years the political repression decreased, despite setbacks in 1960/61, 1965 and 
1976/77. Liberalizations in 1956, 1963 and 1971 brought irreversible changes in their wake. 
For example, open terror had not played a role in political justice since 1963. In addition, 
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death penalty, which had only been rarely enforced since the 1960s and was only retained in 
the presidential term of Erich Honecker to deter Stasi staff from committing treason, was 
carried out for the last time in 1981 and abolished officially in 1987.98 
There were between 180,000 and 250,000 victims of political persecution in the Soviet 
Occupation Zone and the GDR, whereas the number of inhabitants was 17–18 million. 
Considerably more people were affected during the first two decades of the GDR. The 
number of people convicted by political jurisdiction during the Honecker era is estimated to 
be at most 62,000.99 This coincides at least partially with a change in the determination of 
oppositional actions: resistance in the 1950s was often aimed at toppling the SED regime, 
whereas in the 1970s and the 1980s the ruling party was mainly confronted with an exit 
movement or opposition that wanted to improve socialism or create a “third way.” 
Accordingly, the early resistance was fought against with much harsher means than the 
applicants for emigration and the dissident opposition. 
Besides legitimacy and repression, co-optation was another means of maintaining the rule of 
the SED leadership, at least theoretically. However, the initial involvement of bourgeois and 
educated classes in administrative posts and at universities was a stopgap measure that 
disappeared during the 1950s, not least as a result of political repression. Similarly, the co-
optation of technocrats in economic decision-making during the New Economic Policy was 
temporary. In the Soviet Occupation Zone, co-operation with non-communist politicians was 
conducive to establishing SED rule. In the context of the pseudo-parliamentarianism 
implemented shortly afterwards, the political activity of non-communists in bloc parties 
stabilized the SED rule in most cases. In addition, the recruitment of new functionaries was 
subject to loyalty, resulting in homogeneous “socialist service classes”. 
Of course, the East German state had to organize more than mass demonstrations and bogus 
elections. The SED claimed responsibility for almost every aspect of everyday life. Thus, 
there was a mixing of state and individual interests (“Eigensinn”).100 According to Mary 
Fulbrook’s estimate, up to one sixth of the GDR population engaged in state or party 
institution activities.101 However, a closer look at the nature of many of these activities reveals 
their apolitical nature. Examples include popular sport, small gardeners, or promotion of the 
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Sorb minority. Therefore, on the one hand, the ‘normality’ of the dictatorship that Fulbrook 
highlighted is what we find in every political system to some degree. On the other hand, in the 
GDR even these activities were dominated and controlled by central party politics and 
ideology. Dissidents, Christians, non-communist workers, and even minor party members 
were excluded from the inner circle of power. As Peter Grieder pointed out, „the ‘creative 
accommodation’ or modus vivendi that they reached with the regime helped to consolidate it, 
at least in the short and medium term.“102 At the end of the day, the activities of ordinary East 
Germans did not affect the decisions of the Politburo: these were made in isolation. 
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